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Abstract This chapter briefly summarizes the current status of spent nuclear fuel 
and historical development of nuclear fuel cycles in Japan, and problems that 
Japan faces after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident for spent fuel manage-
ment. (1) Aomori Prefecture’s refusal to store HLW and spent fuel in Rokkasho 
without a plan for them to be taken out to a permanent geological repository, (2) 
drainage of national wealth for purchasing additional oil and gas, (3) international 
pressure on Japan not to have an unnecessary Pu stockpile, and (4) perpetual safe-
guards inspection and higher potential radiological risk to be imposed on a final 
repository for spent fuel and separated Pu and U, are coupled to each other, creat-
ing a deadlocked situation after the accident.
Keywords Spent fuel management · Nuclear fuel cycle · Pu stockpile · Phase-out · 
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6.1  Status Quo
Nuclear fuel before usage in a contemporary light-water reactor (LWR) is made 
of uranium oxide (UOX) consisting of the fissile U-235 isotope comprising 4.5 % 
of total uranium (U) atoms. After producing 45,000 mega-watt-days of heat per 
metric ton (MWd/MT), the fuel is discharged from the reactor. This spent fuel 
still contains around 0.8 % of U-235 and 0.9 % of plutonium (Pu) (approximately 
9 kg), of which about 0.5 % (5 kg) is fissile. If one metric ton (MT) of spent fuel is 
reprocessed, 9 kg of Pu and approximately 960 kg of U are recovered separately, 
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and the rest becomes vitrified high-level waste (HLW), including fission-product 
isotopes and minor actinide isotopes, such as neptunium, americium, and curium. 
The HLW is solidified with borosilicate glass in a stainless steel canister.
In the past 50 years of nuclear power utilization in Japan, 25,640 MT of spent 
nuclear fuel has been generated. Of this amount, 7,100 MT was reprocessed in 
France and U.K., and the plant in Tokai-mura currently owned by Japan Atomic 
Energy Agency (JAEA) reprocessed 1,020 MT (Table 6.1). As a result, Japan pos-
sesses approximately 44 MT of plutonium (Pu) (Table 6.2) and about 8,000 can-
isters of HLW. The un-reprocessed spent fuel (25,640 − 1,020 − 7,100 = 17,52
0 MT) is stored either at each nuclear power plant in Japan (total 14,170 MT) 
or in the storage facility attached to the Rokkasho reprocessing plant (3,350 MT). 
14,170 MT occupies approximately 70 % of total storage capacity (20,000 MT) in 
all existing nuclear power plant sites. 3,350 MT is already 97 % of the spent fuel 
storage capacity at the Rokkasho reprocessing plant.
6.2  How Has This Status Quo Been Generated?
In 1955, 10 years after the end of World War II, Japan established the Atomic 
Energy Basic Law, and launched its nuclear development program. The Japanese 
national policy for nuclear fuel cycle was established during the 1970s and 1980s to 
achieve “energy independence” by decreasing dependence on oil, motivated by the 
experience of the oil crises in 1973 and 1979. The establishment of the nuclear fuel 
cycle, consisting of U enrichment, reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel to recover Pu 
and U, and a fast breeder reactor (FBR), became the national policy with the 
 highest priority. In 1988, Japan successfully reached a comprehensive Nuclear 
Table 6.1  Japan’s spent fuel 
balance (02/2013) Stored at JNFL in Rokkasho
3,350 MT
Stored at nuclear power plants 14,170 MT
Reprocessed in U.K. and France 7,100 MT
Reprocessed at Tokai-mura 1,020 MT
Total 25,640 MT
Table 6.2  Japanese 
plutonium stockpile (kg)  
(as of the end of 2011) [1]
in Japan (Pu fissile) 9,295 (6,316)
Reprocessing plants 4,364
MOX fuel plant 3,363
Stored at reactors 1,568
in Europe (Pu fissile) 34,959 (23,308)
U.K. 17,028
France 17,931
Total (Pu fissile) 44,254 (31,837)
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Cooperation Agreement (NCA) with the United States that allowed Japan to 
develop and own the nuclear fuel cycle. It was a remarkable diplomatic achieve-
ment in the international environment after the nuclear test by India in 1974, upon 
which the U.S. strengthened its anti-nuclear fuel cycle policy. Indeed, Japan is the 
only non nuclear weapons country1 that has industrial-scale capability of U enrich-
ment, PUREX reprocessing, and FBRs, acknowledged by the international commu-
nity, particularly by the U.S.
After reaching the U.S.—Japan NCA in 1988, Japan made steady progress 
toward construction of nuclear fuel cycle facilities. In 1992 the Japan Nuclear Fuel 
Industry (JNFI), a private company established by the utilities companies, started 
commercial operation of the first commercial U enrichment plant in Rokkasho, 
with the capacity of 150 MT Separative Work Unit/year. In 1989, the Japan 
Nuclear Fuel Services (JNFS), yet another company established by the utilities, 
submitted a license application for the first commercial reprocessing plant in 
Rokkasho, and in 1993, its construction began.2 JNFI and JNFS were later merged 
into Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited (JNFL). In 1995, an experimental FBR, Monju, 
started electricity supply to the grid.3
After the 1997 Kyoto Protocol ratified at the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), reduction of greenhouse-gas emis-
sions was added as the main objective of nuclear power utilization. In other words, 
the 1997 Kyoto Protocol solidified the raison d’etre of Japan’s nuclear energy 
industry, and this was the mindset in place until the Fukushima Daiichi accident 
on March 11, 2011. Prior to it, the nuclear community firmly believed that the fleet 
of nuclear reactors supported by the nuclear fuel cycle would grow and expand, 
that capacities for U enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing should be established, 
that Pu should be bred by FBRs, and so forth. The Japanese nuclear commu-
nity had never conceived of “sudden braking” scenario as the situation currently 
observed in Japan that all reactors halted operation after the Fukushima Daiichi 
accident. The sudden braking clearly revealed that there was a serious oversight, 
or lack of plan B, in the national policy for development of the nuclear fuel cycle 
and for spent fuel management.
6.3  What Are the Problems with the Current Situation?
After March 11, 2011, all forty-eight operable nuclear reactors in Japan had been 
put out of service one after another due to previously scheduled regular mainte-
nance and inspection, and none could resume operations except for the Number 3 
and 4 reactors at Kansai Electric’s Oi Nuclear Power Station for the term between 
1
 EURATOM consisting of EU countries has similar NCA with the U.S.
2
 But as of 2014 the plant has not started its operation due to a series of technical troubles.
3
 But soon after that it had the sodium leak accident, and stopped its operation since then until now.
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July 2012 and September 2013. Prime Minister Noda expressed his support for the 
restarting of Oi’s two reactors on June 8, 2012, driven by the projection that the 
Kansai area, including Osaka, Kyoto, and Kobe, would otherwise suffer from a 
severe electricity shortage in the coming summer.
While the two units at Oi could restart for a year as an emergency measure, 
others could not, because more stringent regulations implemented after the acci-
dent require all existing 48 reactors to be back-fitted before they obtain permission 
to restart. Aged reactors in general need more work to comply with new regula-
tions, which creates higher costs, but investing in aged reactors may not pay off if 
the remaining license term is not long enough. This would lead utilities companies 
to consider decommissioning their reactors before the license term ends, and thus 
almost certainly the total number of Japanese nuclear reactors will be reduced in 
the future. What is not so clear at this moment is how fast the reduction process 
will occur, and at what capacity the Japanese nuclear fleet size will level off.
The Japanese monthly trade statistics [2, 3] indicate that Japan’s import of 
natural gas jumped from about 3 trillion yen in 2009 and 2010 to 5.4 trillion yen 
in 2011. Similarly, oil imports in 2011 increased to 12 trillion yen from 9 to 10 
trillion yen in the previous years. Such hikes occurred because the gap created 
by loss of the nuclear reactor fleet had to be filled by the existing fleet of fossil-
fired plants. If this situation continues, Japan has to spend an extra 4–5 trillion 
yen every year. In addition, burning oil and gas emits carbon dioxide into the 
atmosphere. In 2011, Japan emitted an extra 175 million ton of carbon dioxide 
compared to the average annual emission before the accident. This pattern will 
continue as long as Japan relies fully on fossil fuels.
When Aomori Prefecture agreed in 1989 to build in Rokkasho the reprocess-
ing plant and attached interim storage facilities for spent fuel and HLW can-
isters, the central government promised that Rokkasho would never be the final 
disposal site for HLW. After the accident, in the course of public discussions 
about whether nuclear power utilization should be continued or phased out and 
whether reprocessing should be carried out or abandoned, Aomori Prefecture 
warned that all spent fuel and HLW canisters currently stored in the Rokkasho site 
must be returned back to their original plants if reprocessing is not carried out in 
Rokkasho. In this case, 3,350 MT of spent fuel stored currently in Rokkasho and 
8,000 canisters of HLW to be returned from U.K. and France would need to be 
relocated from Rokkasho.
In October 2013, in Mutsu city, Aomori, the interim storage facility for spent 
fuel became available first with a 3,000 MT capacity with a planned expansion to 
5,000 MT in the future. Considering that the fleet size is likely to be significantly 
reduced, and that there is a total of approximately 10,000 MT (6,000 in individual 
power plant sites and 3,000–5,000 in Mutsu) of available space for spent fuel stor-
age, Japan can restart reactors for a decade or longer while postponing decision on 
reprocessing. This offers Japan an invaluable grace period to review policy, during 
which time a plan must be developed for the medium- and long-term range.
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The United States has been demanding that Japan make clear its plans for 
commercial Pu utilization to avoid creating a large Pu stockpile. However, with 
the onset of delays in the development of FBR technologies, the Atomic Energy 
Commission and utilities companies decided to introduce utilization of Pu in the 
form of mixed oxide (MOX) fuel with existing LWRs. 44 MT of separated Pu 
(Table 6.2) can be made into approximately 640 MT of MOX fuel at the MOX 
fuel fabrication plant to be commissioned in 2017 at JNFL’s Rokkasho site with 
production capacity of 130 MT/year. Thus, if LWRs can be restarted, the Pu stock-
pile can be burnt in LWRs in the form of MOX. Assurance of timely Pu consump-
tion by MOX utilization will be helpful for the Rokkasho reprocessing plant to 
commence its operation. However, if an immediate nuclear phase-out is chosen, 
this MOX option for dealing with the Pu stockpile would no longer be viable.
Without establishing a complete fuel cycle with FBR, geological disposal 
becomes more complicated. Before the accident, the policy was to reprocess all 
spent nuclear fuel and to utilize separated Pu as MOX first for LWRs, but eventu-
ally for FBRs. If FBRs are deployed, the resultant wastes that require deep geo-
logical disposal are HLW and intermediate-level waste (so-called TRU waste) 
from reprocessing. Because only trace amounts of weapons-usable materials, such 
as Pu, are included in HLW or TRU, the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) would terminate its safeguards inspection for a disposal facility for these 
two types of waste. But, if a repository is for disposal of spent fuel (either MOX 
or UOX), separated Pu and U, IAEA will not terminate its safeguards inspection in 
perpetuity. In addition to safeguardability issues, a geological repository for spent 
fuels can potentially be a greater radiological risk than that for HLW and TRU.
These issues, i.e., (1) Aomori Prefecture’s refusal to store HLW and spent fuel 
in Rokkasho without a plan for them to be taken out to a permanent geological 
repository, (2) drainage of national wealth for purchasing additional oil and gas, 
(3) international pressure on Japan not to have an unnecessary Pu stockpile, and 
(4) perpetual safeguards inspection and higher potential radiological risk to be 
imposed on a final repository for spent fuel and separated Pu and U, are coupled to 
each other, creating a deadlocked situation after the accident. If reactors are back 
in operation and reprocessing is conducted at Rokkasho, aforementioned issues 
(1), (2), and (3) could be solved, but the resultant repository would require high 
maintenance for a long-term period. Public agreement on this scenario seems to be 
very difficult to reach under the current situation. If reactors restart but reprocess-
ing is abandoned, (2) and (3) could be solved, while (1) and (4) remain unsolved. 
If reactors and reprocessing are decommissioned, all four issues remain unsolved, 
while public support for this option may be the greatest.
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